Insights from the Hill: Sound Sciences and the Downer Ban?

If the need for scientists in the political arena was not clear to anyone before December, the downed cattle ban implemented in response to the BSE crisis should have clarified the issue. Since my arrival on the Hill three months ago, I have heard the words “sound science” thrown around as freely as a Frisbee on the Mall. “Sound science” is used as a definitive justification for many decisions made in the political world. “Sound science,” cited by USDA, suggested that the incidence of BSE is higher in the downed cattle population compared with the normal population. Therefore, the USDA inferred that removing downed cattle from the human food chain would remove the risk of BSE. Advocates, some with different motives for the downer ban, praised the USDA’s use of “sound science” in protecting public and animal health. Other groups in opposition countered the USDA’s “sound science” with more “sound science,” supporting the potential environmental and health hazards that would arise from a downer ban. If this were not enough, other groups suggested that banning downed cattle from the food chain would not safeguard against BSE because “sound science” demonstrates that BSE can also be present in clinically normal cattle. In the end, whose “sound science” is a Hill staffer to believe? (Remember, most staffers are 20- to 30-year-old political science majors handling at least three diverse issues.)

The truth as most scientists will tell you is that all of these tidbits of “sound science” are, in part, valid in the context of the experimental parameters in which these results emerged. Results from epidemiological evaluations of the incidence of BSE in the downed cattle population of Sweden and France were used to determine and justify the need for a downer ban by USDA. I and obviously other scientists did not find anything detrimentally flawed in the experiments and results of these epidemiological studies in and of themselves. I would argue the fact that the prevalence of BSE, which is higher in the downed cattle population, makes intuitive sense to most animal scientists and animal health specialist but for a plethora of possible explanations. The problem lies in the plethora of explanations. These various possibilities were the exact possibilities that the USDA needed to explore in more detail to determine the value of a downed cattle ban.

As most know, another type of science weighs into policy making as well, political science. How does science weigh into the political game? Most everyone on the Hill or in the administration are inundated with “sound science” from a large array of constituent groups, most of which have biased angles or, in a few incidences, have “bridges” to sell. To put it bluntly, at the end of the day when decisions need to be made and votes need to happen, the science that wins is the science that best justifies the position that a politician takes. Now the question is do politicians make decisions from the science or do they fit the science to their decisions. This is a bit like the question did the chicken or the egg come first. My experience suggests to me that it is a bit of both.

Another factor that weighs heavily in the decision process is the public and how a decision or the science justifying a decision affects the public in which the government serves. As scientists, we do not necessarily have to consider this to the same extent as politicians. Because I am with Congress and especially because I am in a minority democrat office, I am not privileged to know “the real deal” behind the decision-making process at the USDA, but, from my preliminary observations during my short tenure on the Hill, I can speculate into the nature of the use of “sound science” that led to the downer ban.

In December, the USDA was faced with a crisis that had the potential to cause a considerable scare in the public domain, a scare with the potential for significant economic implications for the beef industry. The perception was that the public needed a dramatic response from the USDA to assure their safety, and the downer ban fit that criterion. Superficially, the downed cattle ban could appear to be the strongly wielded sword that would sever the risk associated with BSE because the “sound science” was clear, BSE was more likely to be present in downer population, so remove the downers.

As time has progressed, many of the complications associated with the downer ban and the relative harm it has caused compared with its ability to reduce the risk of BSE have been surfacing, mostly from constituent groups and other lobbyists that have affected members. Congress has been fairly quiet on the issue. Since the downed cattle ban, only one bill has been introduced in the House (H.R. 4121) in a bi-partisan effort by Reps. Rehberg (R-MT) and Peterson (D-MN) to more narrowly redefine “non-ambulatory” to exclude cattle with broken legs, fatigue, stress, obesity, obdurator nerve paralysis, and dislocations. No press release accompanied the introduction of this bill. In other words, movements on the downer ban have occurred in the undercurrents of the Hill, my guess, to avoid stirring the hairiness of the downed animal issue that has surged in the past during the drafting of the 2002 Farm Bill and again with the introduction of the Downed Animal Protection Act (S. 1298 and H.R.2519).

To return to the question of a scientist’s role in the political process, the primary need is advisory. To the average politician, regulator, and Hill staffer, science, sound or not, is a list of facts “proven” to be true by experimentation. One “fact” does not necessarily have more weight than another “fact.” Scientists are needed to aid in analysis of “sound science” in the context of an issue and to help politicians decide what science is appropriate to address that issue. They also need scientists to explain the potential outcomes from certain decisions based on science and the non-scientific implications of these same decisions. Lastly, and in the long run maybe most importantly, scientists need to help politicians understand what science is and what science can and cannot do for them and the public as a whole.

Marcia S. Noble, Congressional Science Fellow